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Abstract— Lately, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become an emerging technology and can be utilized in 
some crucial circumstances like battlegrounds, commercial applications, habitat observing, buildings, smart homes, 
traffic surveillance and other different places. One of the foremost difficulties that WSN faces nowadays is protection 
from serious attacks. While organizing the sensor nodes in an abandoned environment makes network systems helpless 
against an assortment of strong assaults, intrinsic memory and power restrictions of sensor nodes make the traditional 
security arrangements impractical. The sensing knowledge combined with the wireless communication and processing 
power makes it lucrative for being abused. The wireless sensor network technology also obtains a big variety of security 
intimidations. This paper describes four basic security threats and many active attacks on WSN with their possible 
countermeasures proposed by different research scholars. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The significant improvements of hardware engineering methods and effectual software procedures create a 
network composed of several affordable sensors called a wireless sensor network [1-3]. WSN offers an auspicious 
network arrangement for different applications like home appliance management, environmental monitoring and 
medical care. This is widely used in homeland security and battlefield surveillance scenarios because WSNs are 
simple to install and effective for such circumstances [4]. However, in numerous tactical and hostile situations as 
well as significant vendible applications, safety appliances are predominantly required to secure the WSN from the 
malevolent threats [5]. Therefore, safety in WSN becomes a crucial and challenging task. Some applications of the 
wireless sensor network are also shown in fig.1. 
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Fig. 1. Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications 
A WSN usually contains a big amount of sensor devices where each sensor device is inadequate in its capabilities 
because of the price anxiety during the manufacturing process. For instance, MICA2 MPR400CB [6], a most 
prevalent platform of sensor nodes, has about 128 Kilo-Byte program storage and 8-bit ATmega128L Microchip [7]. 
In different circumstances, it is totally worthless how wisely a safety mechanism for WSN is designed, intruders can 
still become successful to find the vulnerability and perform attacks on the targeted node in WSNs. If intruders 
remain silent to eavesdrop on the network traffic, they can be remained hidden. If they try to disturb the network 
communications, irregularities and anomalies will be identified. Interrupt detection systems can notice these attacks 
by observing the behavioral change and anomalies in the network. A simple type of Wireless Sensor Network is 
depicted in fig. 2.  
 
Fig. 2. Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
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1.1 Some Sensor Networks Applications 
There are different kinds of sensors in wireless sensor network, for instance, thermal, seismic, visual, low 
sampling rate magnetic, acoustic, radar and infrared. Moreover, a large variety of conditions are monitored by 
sensor devices which include temperature, humidity, lightening condition, vehicular movement, Pressure, noise 
levels, the absence or  presence of  some objects kind,  soil makeup, current characteristics like direction, speed, 
object size and mechanical levels of stress on objects that are attached [31]. Three Generations of Sensor network 
nodes and attributes of sensor networks are shown in table 1 & table 2 respectively. 
Table 1 
THREE GENERATIONS OF SENSOR NODES 
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Table 2 
 ATTRIBUTES OF SENSOR NETWORK 
 
II. SECURITY THREATS 
 In WSNs the security services goal is to protect resources and information from misbehavior and attack. WSN 
faces four basic threats, which are shown in fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Four Basic Threats  
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2.1 Confidentiality 
 
It makes sure that only desired recipients can understand the given message. Confidentiality security 
countermeasures are mentioned in fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Confidentiality Security and Countermeasures\ 
2.2 Integrity 
It makes sure that the message is not modified by intermediate nodes which are malicious when it is sent to other 
nodes in a network. Countermeasures for threats on integrity are shown in fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. Integrity Security and Countermeasures 
2.3 Availability 
It makes sure that the services of network are available which are desired even under attacks such as DOS 
(denial-of-service). Security countermeasures for availability threats are shown in fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6. Availability Security and Countermeasures 
2.4 Non-Repudiation 
Non-Repudiation refers to the facility to guarantee that a person cannot negate the authenticity of their signature. 
Countermeasures for Non-repudiation threats are shown in fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7. Non-Repudiation Security and Countermeasures 
 
III. SECURITY ATTACKS 
There are basically two main types of attacks that an intruder may adopt. (i) Passive attacks and (ii) Active attacks  
3.1 Passive Attacks 
These attacks are referred to just listening the communication. In this kind of attack, an intruder snoops the 
communications silently but does not make any changes in communication [8]. However, these attacks are normally 
preliminary arrangements before the active attacks. This is basically an attack against privacy. 
3.1.1 Eavesdropping 
This is very common violence against privacy. By interfering to personal data, an attacker could simply learn the 
content of communication. When traffic delivers control data about configuration of sensor network, which 
comprises hypothetically thorough information than the available through location server, snooping or 
eavesdropping can behave more efficiently against confidentiality. 
3.1.2 Traffic Analysis 
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Messages transferred over the network are vulnerable even if they are encrypted. There is a big possibility that 
someone can analysis the patterns of communication. Sensor activities can possibly expose sufficient information to 
let an opponent to cause malevolent harm to the wireless sensor network. 
3.2 Active Attacks 
Active attacks are referred to the modifying messages and real data steam or generating the false data in 
communication. An intruder may repeat old data streams, changing the communicating messages or remove some 
selected part of important messages of communication. Some Active and passive attacks are depicted in fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8. Active and passive attacks 
3.2.1 DoSAttack 
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are done by devastating targeted server by putting extra traffic than the server’s 
maximum processing limit [9, 29]. DoS attack is typically performed by overwhelming the targeted node with 
excessive requests to overload the systems and stops all or some legitimate requests from being answered. The 
scheme of WSN devices typically favors reduced cost over enlarged capabilities. The basic features of sensor 
network devices make them susceptible to DoS attacks. 
3.2.2 Masquerade Attack 
This attack refers to the usage of a fake personality to gain the illegal access to any personal computer. An 
attacker acts as an unauthorized system to gain access to it or to increase greater rights than they are approved for 
[28]. Masquerade attack typically involves another type of active attack. For example, verification arrangements can 
be taken, and then an illegitimate person can obtain rights to access all the important information illegally. 
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3.2.3 Replay Attack 
It usually involves passive imprisonment of the data unit and its succeeding retransmission to generate an 
unauthorized consequence [30, 32].This is carried out by an adversary or by an originator who interrupts the 
information and retransmits it. 
3.2.4 Selective Forwarding 
Timely and Secure transmission of information in the WSN is its essential requisite of the network. In this kind of 
attacks, malicious systems act as the normal systems and drop selected packets. In selective forwarding attack, 
selection of the dropping nodes can be haphazard [10]. 
3.2.5 Node Replication 
In Node Replication attack, an adversary makes special easily affordable wireless sensor nodes and tricks entire 
network into accommodating them like the authentic nodes [12]. Node replication is difficult to detect without 
centralized monitoring. 
3.2.6 Wormhole Attack 
This is basically a very serious attack in which an intruder records the stream of bits or packets at specific 
position in wireless network and channels those to some other locations. Capturing and retransmitting of bit streams 
or packets could be done in selective manner [27]. Wormhole attacks normally used with the eavesdropping or 
selective forwarding attacks. Detection is quite problematic when used in combination with Sybil attack. 
3.2.7 Sybil Attack 
In Sybil attacks, a node presents as several duplicate nodes using the identities of other authentic nodes. Sybil 
attack actually goals to fault accepting schemes like distributed storage and multipath routing [11]. Sybil attack 
poses an important risk to “geographic routing protocols”. Position knowing routing normally requires different 
nodes to share data with their nearby nodes to proficiently route the geographically addressed packets. 
3.2.8 Sink Hole Attack 
A malicious node represents itself as a black hole to appeal and catch all traffic especially in WSNs. An attacker 
snoops requests paths then shows to targeted systems that it comprises best quality or shortest distance to base 
station. Attacker insert itself between the collaborating nodes, it is capable to make any changes in information 
passing among them [26]. 
3.2.9 Rushing Attack 
A latest threat that usually results in the denial-of-service (DoS) when utilized against all preceding network 
routing practices. An attacker distributes the malicious messages very quickly to genuine messages that reach later 
[22].  
 
3.2.10 Modification of Messages 
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Message modification attacks refer to an attack where an attacker performs modifications or deletions to the 
content of wireless network communication. In this attack, some portion of information is transformed or real 
messages are postponed or recorded to produce an unauthorized effect [35]. 
IV. ACTIVE ATTACKS AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURES 
Countermeasures of various active attacks on wireless sensor network are mentioned in table 3. 
Table 3 
ACTIVE ATTACKS AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURES 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Security is now becoming a main anxiety for Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) feature designers due to extensive 
safety precarious applications of these networks. In this paper, we have conferred some active attacks regarding 
WSN and also mentioned their best corresponding countermeasures. However, lots of open issues are still remaining 
to be explored. On one hand, WSN is not fully matured yet and still under progress. Numerous protocols developed 
until now for the WSN have not maturely satisfied the security threats. On other hand, significant protocols and 
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requirements of WSN sometimes make it difficult to develop some solid security schemes while still supporting low 
operational cost. Hence, safety for the WSN is an open and fruitful research direction to be worked on. 
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